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Brandt Hill† & Ted Holt†† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between October 2019 and September 2020, there were no 
noteworthy appellate decisions interpreting Alabama law directly 
relevant to oil and gas companies or operations. Similarly, there are 
no statutory amendments or administrative decisions impacting oil and 
gas companies operating in the state. However, the Alabama Supreme 
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opinion addressing jurisdiction and procedural issues that are relevant 
to operators in Alabama. We discuss those opinions below.   
II. STATE COURTS 
Several Alabama water and sewer boards (the “Boards”) filed suit 
against Georgia-based carpet and chemical manufacturers (the 
“Companies”) alleging they dumped toxic chemicals from their plants 
into rivers that flowed downstream and eventually contaminated water 
sources in Alabama.1   
All of the Companies were Georgia corporations that did not have 
business in Alabama, and each plant was located in Georgia near the 
Conasauga River.2 The Conasauga River feeds into the Coosa River, 
which begins in northwest Georgia and flows across the border into 
Alabama.3 The Boards claimed that the Companies sent their 
wastewater to a third party, Dalton Utilities, who ineffectively treated 
the wastewater and then discharged it into the Conasauga River.4  
After the Boards brought suit in Alabama state court, the 
Companies moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.5 They 
argued that the Boards had “not alleged any conduct that actually 
occurred in Alabama” and that releasing water from the Companies’ 
Georgia plants did not establish that they “purposefully directed” their 
activities into Alabama, the forum state.6 The trial court denied their 
motion, reasoning that “the actions of an entity that result in harmful 
substances being placed into a water source can result in harm 
downstream in a foreign jurisdiction, and it is reasonable for the entity 
causing those substances to be placed into the water to expect that their 
downstream harm could cause them to be hauled into court in that 
foreign jurisdiction.”7 The Companies then petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus to the Alabama Supreme Court.8 
The Alabama Supreme Court noted that the issues presented were 
novel. “This Court has not been presented with a factual scenario in 
which out-of-state defendants are alleged to have caused 
environmental pollution in another state but where the consequences 
 
 1. Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., No. 1170864, 2019 WL 6974629, at *1 (Ala. 
Dec. 20, 2019) (the chemical at issue is known as “PFC”).  
 2. Id. at *5–7. 
 3. Id. at *9.   
 4. Id. at *2–4. 
 5. Id. at *1, *3–4. 
 6. Id. at *3, *10. 
 7. Id. at *3.  
 8. Id. at *1.  
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of those acts have caused harm in Alabama. As a result, this Court has 
no established precedent or an approach for evaluating this unique 
situation.”9 
The Court began its analysis by referencing well-established 
personal jurisdiction principles. Alabama’s long-arm statute “extends 
to the limits of due process,”10 the Court explained, and due process 
requires that before a court exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant, it must be shown that “the defendant has ‘minimum 
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”11 To exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, 
“(1) the defendant must have ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the 
benefits and privileges of the forum state or ‘purposefully directed’ 
activity toward the forum state . . . and (2) there must be a relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”12 Ultimately, 
“[t]he issue of personal jurisdiction stands or falls on the unique facts 
of [each] case.”13 
The Court first addressed the Companies’ argument that “because 
they sent their industrial wastewater to Dalton Utilities,” an 
independent third party, they could not be considered to have 
“purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting 
activities within Alabama or to have undertaken any purposeful 
conduct aimed at Alabama.”14 The Companies argued that Dalton 
Utilities’ failure to adequately treat their wastewater was an 
“intervening cause that br[oke] the chain of causation.”15 But the 
Court rejected this defense, finding that the Boards had sufficiently 
alleged that “the intervening cause was foreseeable.”16  
The Court then considered the Companies’ argument that even if it 
was “foreseeable” that Dalton Utilities would not adequately treat 
their wastewater and that the chemicals would make their way into 
Alabama, the “purposeful-availment” requirement would still not be 
satisfied.17 “Foreseeability alone,” the Companies asserted, “has never 
 
 9. Id. at *10.  
 10. Id. at *14 (quoting Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d 1025, 1030 (Ala. 
2005)). 
 11. Id. at *8 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 12. Id. at *25.  
 13. Id. at *26 (quoting Ex parte Phil Owens Used Cars, Inc., 4 So. 3d 418, 423 
(Ala. 2008)). 
 14. Id. at *28.   
 15. Id. at *29. 
 16. Id. at *29–30.  
 17. Id. at *30. 
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been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction.”18 On this point 
the Court agreed. A “foreseeability alone” approach “would start us 
on a slippery slope.”19 Nevertheless, in ultimately finding the trial 
court had jurisdiction over the Companies, the Court appeared to base 
its decision on the Companies’ knowledge that the chemicals would 
travel into Alabama and cause harm there.20  
The Court distinguished the cases, cited by the Companies, that 
have held “foreseeability alone” is insufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant. Those cases typically involved the 
manufacture and sale of a product in a foreign jurisdiction that 
eventually made its way into the forum state without any activity by 
the manufacturer in the forum state.21 In those circumstances, the 
manufacturer had no “suit-related nexus with the forum state,” so 
specific jurisdiction “can[not] attach.”22 But in this case, the 
Companies were alleged to have a much closer connection to 
Alabama, and the underlying lawsuit “ar[o]se out of” the Companies’ 
activities directed towards Alabama.23  
According to the Court, “by virtue of knowingly discharging PFC-
containing chemicals in their industrial wastewater, knowing they 
were ineffectively treated by Dalton Utilities, and knowing that the 
PFCs would end up in the Coosa River, which flows into Alabama, 
the . . . defendants . . . purposefully directed their actions at Alabama. 
Such alleged conduct on the part of the remaining defendants in 
relation to Alabama is not random, fortuitous, or 
attenuated . . . regardless of the distance the chemicals traveled to 
reach the sites in Alabama where the injuries occurred.”24 After 
“reiterat[ing] that foreseeability alone is insufficient to confer specific 
personal jurisdiction,” the Court observed that “pursuant to the 
allegations” in the Boards’ complaint, the Companies “knowingly and 
directly aimed tortious actions at Alabama.”25 
The Court then concluded with a brief assessment of whether 
exercising jurisdiction over the Companies “complies with traditional 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at *42. 
 21. Id. at *11–12. 
 22. Id. at *32.  
 23. Id. at *36, 45–46 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
472 (1985)).  
 24. Id. at *15 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 
(1985)). 
 25. Id. 
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notices of fair play and substantial justice.”26 According to the Court, 
“[t]here is no demonstrable burden” to the Companies from having to 
litigate in the Alabama trial court, just seventy and ninety miles away 
from where the Companies were located in Georgia. Moreover, the 
“alleged injury occur[ed] in Alabama,” and Alabama had a 
“significant and manifest interest” in providing its residents with a 
convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state 
actors.27Accordingly, the Court denied the Companies’ petition.28  
III. FEDERAL COURTS 
Two hundred and thirty people who previously worked at a foundry 
outside Birmingham alleged they were harmed by exposure to toxic 
substances released and formed at the foundry.29 Because the foundry 
went out of business, the workers sued the companies that 
manufactured, sold, supplied, and distributed the products they 
believed caused the harm.30 Those products included “specialized 
shell core sand,” “chemical resins, binders, setting catalysts, and 
chemically treated foundry sand pre-mix products,” as well as 
“trimethylamine liquid or gas” and a “release agent” that were used 
for “molding, coring, casting, finishing, or other foundry processes.”31 
While all 230 workers alleged they were harmed by one or more of 
these products, not all of the workers were employed at the foundry at 
the same time, and they did not all work the same jobs.32  
The workers filed suit in Alabama state court seeking relief under 
Alabama state law. All of their claims stemmed from the allegation 
that the “normal and foreseeable” use of the products caused the 
“release and formation of hazardous and carcinogenic chemical 
substances” that harmed the workers.33  
One of the companies removed the case to federal court on the basis 
that the workers’ allegations gave rise to federal jurisdiction under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).34 Specifically, the 
company asserted that federal jurisdiction existed because the case 
 
 26. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 27. Id. at *15–16 (quoting Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 656 (Ala. 2009)). 
 28. Id. at *16. 
 29. Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prod. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 738.  
 34. Id.; see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 
4. CAFA is codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.  
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qualified as a “mass action,” which is statutorily defined by CAFA as 
any action seeking more than $5,000,000 in monetary relief with more 
than 100 minimally diverse plaintiffs whose claims involve common 
questions of law or fact.35 The workers then moved to remand the case 
back to Alabama state court,36 arguing that an exception to CAFA 
jurisdiction existed.37 Invoking what is known as the “local event 
exception” to CAFA, the workers argued that the case was not a “mass 
action” because “all of the claims . . . arise from an event or 
occurrence in the [s]tate in which the action was filed,” and this event 
or occurrence “resulted in injuries in that [s]tate or in [s]tates 
contiguous to that [s]tate.”38 The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama agreed with the workers and granted 
their motion to remand.39 The companies then appealed that ruling to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.40 
“This appeal turns on the meaning of the local event exception, in 
particular the phrase ‘an event or occurrence,’” the Eleventh Circuit 
observed at the outset.41 “If the allegations in the complaint constitute 
an ‘event or occurrence,’” then “the [d]istrict [c]ourt was correct in 
remanding the case back to state court.”42 The workers argued that 
“event or occurrence” did not require a “one-time event” or a 
“discre[te] moment in time,” such that the underlying harm they 
claimed to have suffered, spread out over a number of years, was a 
“continuing tort” that satisfied the “event or occurrence” definition.43 
Meanwhile, the companies claimed that “an event or occurrence” 
meant “a single focused event,” such that the workers’ alleged harm 
was “too disparate and disconnected.”44 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis “beg[a]n with the text of the 
statute.”45 Because CAFA did not define “event or occurrence,” the 
court considered the ordinary meaning of those terms and 
interpretations offered by other courts.46 It concluded that the phrase 
“event or occurrence” was “broad enough to include a single solitary 
 
 35. Spencer, 953 F.3d at 738 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (11)(B)(i)).  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)).  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 739. 
 41. Id.   
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 740. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 740–43. 
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happening that occurs in a single moment of time and (in some cases 
at least) a continuing set or related circumstances,” or “series of 
connected events occurring over a longer period of time,” that 
“culminates in [a] harm-causing event or occurrence.”47 Thus, the 
Eleventh Circuit ultimately adopted neither the workers’ nor the 
companies’ interpretation, instead choosing a definition somewhere in 
the middle.  
With this definition of “event or occurrence” in mind, the Eleventh 
Circuit turned to the facts before it and concluded that the allegations 
in the workers’ complaint did not demonstrate that their case fell 
within the “local event exception.”48 That was so for three reasons.  
First, there was a “large number of defendants that acted separately 
to generate the alleged harm.”49 This fact was “not dispositive,” the 
Eleventh Circuit noted, but nonetheless important because “the 
[p]laintiffs allege the [d]efendants’ products were used in different 
ways and caused different harms.”50 “[T]he acts that led to the harm-
causing event or occurrence must be ‘collective’ and ‘related.’”51 
Second, the workers’ complaint did not allege “a single culminating 
event that caused their harm.”52 Instead, “their complaint alleges a 
string of events over time and later-resulting harm.”53 There was no 
“culminating harm-causing event” distinguishing the instant case from 
other cases that the workers relied on.54 Third, the workers did not 
sufficiently allege “how the [d]efendants’ conduct came together to 
create one event or occurrence.”55 While “the foundry was open for 
decades,” the Eleventh Circuit found that the workers “d[id] not say 
when the [d]efendants committed the alleged torts or how and when 
[they] were harmed.”56 
 
 47. Id. at 740–42.  
 48. Id. at 744. 
 49. Id. at 743. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. (quoting Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 
405, 413 (5th Cir. 2014)).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. (citing Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d at 279-
80; Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 407, 413 (single well failed); Adams v. Int’l 
Paper Co., No. 1:17-CV-105, 2017 WL 1828908, at *7 (S.D. Ala. May 5, 2017) 
(one defendant’s release of toxic pollutants by a defendant followed by another 
defendant’s actions exacerbating the release of those same pollutants)).  
 55. Id. at 744.  
 56. Id.  
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Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant 
of the workers’ motion to remand and remanded the case back to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.57 
 
 
 57. Id.  
